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Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that the mind sometimes extends outside
the body to encompass features of the environment (HEC). HEC has been criticised
by Fred Adams, Kenneth Aizawa, and Robert Rupert. In this paper, I argue for two
claims: (1) HEC is a harder target than those critics have supposed; HEC is entailed by
functionalism, a commonly held view in philosophy of mind, and one to which those
critics are already committed. (2)e version of HEC entailed by functionalism is more
radical than the version that Clark and Chalmers suggest. I argue that this version of
HEC is so radical as to form a counterexample to functionalism.e conclusion of the
paper is against both HEC and functionalism.
Introduction
Andy Clark and David Chalmers claim that cognitive processes can and do extend outside
the head.1 Call this the ‘hypothesis of extended cognition’ (HEC). HEC has been strongly
criticised by Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa and Robert Rupert.2 In this paper I argue for two
claims. First, HEC is a harder target than Rupert, Adams and Aizawa have supposed. A
widely-held view about the nature of the mind, functionalism—a view to which Rupert,
Adams andAizawa appear to subscribe—entailsHEC. EitherHEC is true, or functionalism
is false.e relationship between functionalism and HEC goes beyond support for the
relatively uncontroversial claim that it is logically or nomologically possible for cognition
to extend (the ‘can’ part of HEC); functionalism entails that cognitive processes do extend
in the actual world. Second, I argue that the version of HEC entailed by functionalism
is more radical than the version that Clark and Chalmers suggest. I argue that it is so
radical as to form a counterexample to functionalism. If functionalism is modied to
prevent these consequences, thenHEC falls victim to Rupert, Adams and Aizawa’s original
criticism. An advocate of HEC has two choices: (1) accept functionalism and radical HEC;
1. Clark and Chalmers (1998).
2. Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2007); Rupert (2004).
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(2) give up HEC entirely. Clark and Chalmers’ intermediate position of a modest form of
HEC is unsustainable.
e argument of this paper, although initially appearing to support Clark and Chalmers,
ultimately argues against their position.e price of HEC is rampant expansion of the
mind into the world, and the implausibility of such expansion is indicative of deep-seated
problems with functionalism.e argument of this paper consequently speaks to wider
issues than just the status of HEC.e reasons for HEC’s failure bring to light new troubles
with functionalism as an account of cognitive systems.
In Sections 1–3, I giveClark andChalmers’ argument forHEC, Rupert, Adams andAizawa’s
criticism, and my response. In Section 4, I argue that functionalism (of a minimal kind)
entails HEC. In Section 5, I show that the modest version of HEC proposed by Clark and
Chalmers is unsustainable. In Section 6, I analyse the features of functionalism responsible
for generating radical HEC. In Section 7, I criticise the other main argument for HEC: that
HEC should be accepted based on its explanatory value to cognitive science. I conclude
that HEC, and the functionalism that supports it, should be rejected.
1 HEC
Clark and Chalmers introduce HEC with two thought experiments. e rst thought
experiment involves three ways of playing the computer game Tetris. In Tetris, the
player rotates falling blocks to form complete horizontal rows which are then eliminated.
Imagine:
t1 Sitting facing a computer screen and mentally rotating a block to judge whether it
will t the sockets below.
t2 Sitting facing a computer screen and physically rotating the image on screen by
pressing a rotate button to judge whether the block will t the sockets below.
t3 Choosing to perform the rotation using either old-fashioned mental rotation or a
neural implant that quickly rotates one’s mental image on demand.
First, Clark and Chalmers argue that the implant version of T3 is just as much a cognitive
process as T1: there seems no reason why an implant cannot count as cognitive merely
because it is articial, and one can imagine that the implant is as tightly integrated with
the rest of the player’s cognitive system as one likes. Second, they argue that T2 is just as
much a cognitive process as T3. One can imagine that T2 and T3 have the same functional
structure: the neural implant uses same algorithm for rotation as in T2, it is initiated in
the same way (by motor cortex activity), and it produces output in a similar way (a retinal
image).e dierence is that in T2 the processing is spread between the agent and the
computer, while in T3 all the processing takes place inside the agent. Since the question
is whether cognitive processes can cross the skin/skull boundary, it would be question-
begging to object that T2 is not cognitive only because it does cross that boundary. Clark
and Chalmers claim that T2 and T3 are otherwise alike.eir conclusion is that T2 and
T3 have an equal claim to be cognitive.
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e second thought experiment involves dispositional belief. Inga hears of an exhibition
at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA). She thinks, recalls that MoMA is on 53rd St.,
and sets o. Otto suers from a mild form of Alzheimer’s and always writes down useful
information in a notebook. He hears of the exhibition at MoMA, retrieves the address
from his notebook, and sets o.
Clark and Chalmers claim that Otto’s notebook plays a similar functional role to Inga’s
biological memory.e state of Otto’s notebook interacts with Otto’s desires and other
beliefs in a similar way to the way in which Inga’s biomemory interacts with her desires
and other beliefs. Exposure to new information causes Otto to modify the state of his
notebook. Exposure to new information causes Inga to modify her biomemory. e
current state of Otto’s notebook causes Otto to stop at 53rd St.e current state of Inga’s
biomemory causes Inga to stop at 53rd St.e functional role of the stored information—
its ‘functional poise’3—appears to be the same in both cases. Clark and Chalmers conclude
that just as Inga has a belief that MoMA is on 53rd St., so Otto has a belief, with the same
content, that extends partially into the environment.
Both cases rely onwhat Clark calls the ‘parity’ principle (which I will call the ‘fair-treatment’
principle).is principle guarantees equal treatment between internal and external cases.
It states that if an extended process is relevantly similar to an internal cognitive processes
(save for having external parts), then that extended process should have an equal claim to
be cognitive. In short, one should not be prejudiced against extended processes. Extended
processes should not have to meet a higher standard merely because they are extended.
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which,
were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part
of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of
the cognitive process. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 8)4
e fair-treatment principle enables Clark and Chalmers to argue that if two processes
are just like one another, save for one being internal and the other extended, then both
have an equal right to be cognitive.e purpose of the Tetris and Otto/Inga cases is to
show that, in the actual world, there are extended processes that are just like internal
cognitive processes: Otto’s notebook is functionally just like Inga’s biomemory and T2 is
functionally just like T3.
Rupert, Adams and Aizawa (RAA) accept the fair-treatment principle but reject Clark
and Chalmers’ treatment of the Tetris and Otto/Inga cases. RAA argue that once one
considers the ne-grained functional structure of these cases, one can see that actual
extended processes are not functionally like any internal cognitive process.e processes
involved in T2 and Otto’s notebook are so unlike any internal cognitive processes that
they do not deserve to be called cognitive at all.
3. Clark (2010).
4. See also Clark (2007).
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Imagine memorizing a list of husbands and wives, A–B (‘John–Mary’, ‘Peter–Jane’, ‘David–
Sarah’, etc.). Suppose that you are then told the couples divorce and remarry among
themselves, and you attempt to memorize the new list of partners, A–C (‘John–Sarah’,
‘Peter–Mary’, ‘David–Jane’, etc.). Humans take signicantly longer to learn the new A–C
associations than theA–B associations, or a list of new associations. It appears thatmemory
of the old A–B associations interferes with ability to acquire new A–C associations.is
phenomenon is called ‘negative transfer’.5 Negative transfer is widely-exhibited in human
memory (short-term memory, long-term memory, working memory, memory of names,
stories, and numerical relations), but it is absent in the extended process described by
Clark and Chalmers: it need not be any harder for Otto to write and recall A–C than it
was for him to write and recall A–B.
If one were to adjust the Otto–notebook system so as to simulate negative transfer, there
would be other features of human memory that the system would still lack: generation
eects (better performance with self-generated mnemonics), satisfaction of power laws of
remembering and forgetting, t with human needs given the statistical properties of the
environment, satisfaction of laws governing conditions of learning and extinction such as
the Rescorla–Wagner law (Rupert 2004, pp. 416, 419).ese features are characteristic of
human memory, but not of writing information in a notebook. If one were to modify the
Otto–notebook system to simulate all these features, then one would have moved so far
from the original Otto–notebook scenario as to no longer have anything that corresponds
to actual human tool-use.erefore, Rupert concludes, extended memory processes do
not occur in the actual world.
Adams and Aizawa argue similarly that the functional and causal structures of T1 and
T2 are dierent. In T2, but not T1, there is muscle activity, and hence activation of motor
processing systems. In T2, the agent must decide between two methods, which means that
she must use additional cognitive systems: attentional mechanisms and memory to store
the information that both methods are available. Finally, the causal structure of processes
outside the agent in T2 (button pressing, electrons red towards a phosphorescent screen)
seem unlike the causal structure of processes that take place inside the head in T1.
In a similar vein, Adams and Aizawa argue that picking up the notebook and turning to
an appropriate page requires use of Otto’s motor systems; turning to an appropriate page
and reading requires use of his visual systems; interacting with the notebook involves
acquiring beliefs about the formal and physical nature of the notebook, e.g. that it is open
at a particular page.ese features are not reproduced in Inga’s case.erefore, the causal
role of the notebook in Otto’s cognitive life is not the same as that of belief in Inga’s.e
typical causes and eects of the notebook are so dierent from those of Inga’s biomemory
that there is no reason why if the latter is mental, we should think that the former is too.
5. Rupert (2004), pp. 413–415; Anderson (2000), pp. 239–243.
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Clark (2010) indicates a powerful response to RAA that I wish to elaborate. RAA argue
that, on a ne-grained level, extended processes are functionally unlike internal cognitive
processes and so do not deserve to be called cognitive.e response is that if one draws the
boundary between the cognitive and the non-cognitive this nely, then one is committed
to the claim that Martians cannot have cognitive processes.
e Martian intuition claims that it is possible for creatures with mental states to exist
even if such creatures have a dierent physical and biological makeup to ourselves. An
intelligent organism might contain green slime instead of neurons, it might be made out
of silicon rather than carbon, it might have dierent kinds of connections in its ‘nervous’
system.ere seems no reason why mentality has to involve blood, neural tissue, or DNA.
e Martian intuition applies to ne-grained psychology as well as physiology.ere is no
reason why an intelligent Martian should have exactly the same ne-grained psychology
as ours. A Martian’s pain response may not decay in exactly the same way as ours, its
learning proles and reaction times may not exactly match ours, the typical causes and
eects of its mental states may not be exactly the same as ours, even the large-scale
functional relationships between theMartian’s cognitive systems (e.g. between its memory
and perception) may not match ours.6,7
RAA focus on ne-grained features of cognition, such as negative transfer. But an intelli-
gent Martian need not exhibit negative transfer. RAA focus on reaction-time patterns and
learning curves. But aMartian need not exhibit the same reaction times or learning curves.
RAA focus on characteristic errors. But a Martian need not make the same characteristic
errors. RAA focus on Otto’s use of his visual and motor systems to access his notebook.
But a Martian may access its memory by using its visual and motor systems (it might
store a memory by activating a certain pattern of motor activity, and it might retrieve
a memory by seeing an image). RAA focus on additional attentional mechanisms used
in T2 to perform rotation. But a Martian might use attentional mechanisms to perform
mental rotation (it might deliberately decide between two dierent internal methods of
mental rotation).8
One could imagine a Martian whose memory, instead of being stored in patterns of neural
activity, was stored internally as a series of ink-marks. If the Martian wished to store new
information, it would activate a process that would create new ink-marks in its storage
system. If it wished to retrieve information, it would activate a process that would make a
6. e Martian intuition is typically formulated in the case of qualitative mental state (like pain).
However, there is no reason why it should not apply to cognitive states (like belief), and cognitive processes
(like inference).
7. Cf. Shoemaker (1984), p. 281: ‘But what reason is there for thinking that these underlying processes
and mechanisms [involved in perception, memory, information processing] must be the same in all
creatures having mental states? In other words, what reason is there for thinking that all creatures having
mental states must have the same “depth psychology”? As far as I can see, there is no reason for thinking
that this is so, and there are good reasons for thinking that it is not.’
8. Note that the Martian intuition is not that a Martian could have a mental state that is in every aspect
identical to a human mental state.e claim is that for a given type of human mental state (e.g. belief that
X), it does not seem necessary to have human physical and ne-grained psychological makeup in order to
have that state.
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mental image of ink-marks appear in its visual system. It seems wrong to say that simply
because a Martian stored its memories this way, we should deduce that it had no mental
life, or lacked genuinely mental memory states or processes. In principle, there seems no
bar to such a Martian having beliefs and mental states (provided, for example, it exhibited
the relevant coarse-grained features of memory, and caused occurrent beliefs and desires
in an appropriate way). Such a creature would have internal states with the causes and
eects typical of the notebook in the Otto–notebook system. But just because a creature
used ink-marks rather than neurons to store information, we would not conclude that it
must thereby lack mental states.
RAA’s objection to HEC is that ne-grained features of human cognition are necessary for
mentality. But this seems wrong. Martians could dier from us in all kinds of ne-grained
psychological ways and still have mental states.erefore, such features are not necessary
for mentality. is addresses RAA’s worry, but it does not provide a positive argument for
HEC. I wish now to argue that a number of varieties of functionalism entail HEC.
4 Functionalism entails HEC
Functionalism was in part designed to avoid necessarily withholding mentality from
creatures with a dierent ne-grained makeup. Most versions of functionalism aim to
save the Martian intuition in some form or other.9 Functionalism preserves the Martian
intuition by claiming that what makes an organism have a mental state is the organism’s
functional organisation. is is typically understood in terms of the notion of a causal
role, which in turn is understood as a pattern of typical causes and eects. To a rst
approximation, one could describe the causal role of pain as follows:
Pain is the state that tends to be caused by bodily injury, and causes the belief
that something is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of that state;
it also tends to cause anxiety, and, in the absence of any stronger, conicting
desires, wincing and moaning. (Levin, Fall 2004)
According to functionalism, any state that has this pattern of typical causes and eects
is a pain state.10ere is no reason why this state cannot be realized in a Martian with
a silicon-based physiology and Martian ne-grained psychology, or in a human with
a carbon-based physiology and human ne-grained psychology. Similarly, a Martian
could have a belief state by having a state with the causes and eects typical of belief, or a
cognitive process by having a causal process that relates its mental states in a way typical
of that cognitive process.
9. For versions that do not, see point 6 below.
10. Causal roles are usually described in terms of Ramsey sentences.is allows them to be specied
without the use of mental state terms.e following Ramsey sentence roughly describes the causal role of
pain: ∃x∃y∃z (x tends to be caused by bodily injury & x tends to cause states y, z, a & x tends to cause
wincing and moaning). No mental state terms appear in this sentence. If the sentence is expanded to
include a theory of the causal relations between all our mental states, then it will (hopefully) specify all the
appropriate causal roles informatively in a non-circular way. Although crucial to developing functionalism,
the details of this method of specication make no dierence to the current argument. See Lewis (1972) for
the method.
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Dierent brands of functionalism dier in how the causal roles should be specied.ere
are a number of dimensions of variation.e one to which I wish to draw attention is that
the causal roles can be specied in ner or coarser grained detail. Adopting an appropriate
level of detail is crucial to preserving the Martian intuition.
Human mental states have many typical causes and eects. As well as being impractical,
it would be wrong for a functionalist to specify all the typical causes and eects. Some
causes and eects are ignored in the functional specication. For example, a typical cause
of pain in humans is apprehending a hurtful remark—ignored in the specication above.
A typical eect of pain is decreased sensitivity to more minor injuries—also ignored.e
reason some causes and eects should be ignored is that some causes and eects of human
pain are not be essential to having pain. It is conceivable that a hurtful remark typically
causes anger rather than pain in a Martian; and that pain causes an increase, or no change,
in a Martian’s level of sensitivity to more minor injuries.
While some causes and eects should be ignored, others should be abstracted to form
a more general kind. All the following typically cause pain in humans: a blow to the
head, a cut, a burn, and a gastric upset. Rather than enumerate each pain-causing event,
a functionalist would do better to form the general kind bodily injury. is is not only
more concise, it is also essential to preserving the Martian intuition. A Martian may not
be able to suer from gastric upsets, and it may be unaected by, or feel pleasure from, a
blow to the head.
All varieties of functionalism contain a parameter that controls how nely or coarsely
functional roles should be specied (how much should be abstracted and ignored). If this
parameter is set too ne, then one is committed to Martians who dier from us in minor
ways not having mental states. If the parameter is set too coarse, then functional role
specications are too easy to satisfy, and systems that are intuitively non-mental wrongly
count as mental. My claim is that if the grain parameter is set at least coarse enough to
allow for intelligent Martians, then it also allows in many cases of extended cognition.11
e justication for the claim is that cases of extended cognition are at least as similar to
cases of internal human cognition as possible Martian thought processes. Pick a putative
case of extended cognition, e.g. the Otto–notebook system. One can imagine, as we did
before, a Martian whose memory operates in the same way as Otto’s notebook. Such a
Martian’s thought processes would be at least as dierent from internal human cognition
as the Otto–notebook system—the Otto–notebook system at least contains Otto’s internal
human cognitive processes. However, we saw that just because such a Martian had a
storage and recall system that operated in a dierent way from humans, that was no reason
to conclude that it lacked genuine beliefs. If this is the case, then the functional roles
associated with belief have to be set coarse enough to allow such Martians to have belief:
creatures who might not exhibit negative transfer, and have dierent learning curves and
11. e grain parameter is multi-dimensional since a functionalist theory needs to decide which features
to abstract and ignore, not just a singlemagnitude howmuch.is does not aect the argument. Assume that
grain parameter can vary along dimensions α, β, γ, . . . is means that the grain parameter’s components
along α, β, γ, . . . (gα , gβ , gγ , . . . ) need to be set coarse enough to allow Martians who dier along those
dimensions to have mental states. But as described above, there are extended processes that depart from
internal human cognition less jointly along each of those dimensions than possible Martians.erefore,
those extended systems also satisfy the functional roles.
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reaction times. But if the functional roles are set this coarse, then they are also satised by
the Otto–notebook system.erefore, Otto’s notebook counts as an extended belief.
Consider another example of extended cognition: counting on one’s ngers.12 One could
imagine a Martian that uses ination of eshy tubes inside its head when counting. When
the Martian wishes to add two numbers, it lls tubes in sequence (e.g. 2 + 3); another
internal process detects how many tubes have been inated. e mechanism could be
initiated by activity in the Martian’s motor system and yield output to its visual system.
We would wish to say that such a Martian has a dierent mechanism for counting from
us, but we would not wish to conclude that it must be non-cognitive as a result.erefore,
the functional roles characterising counting should be set coarse enough to allow such
a Martian to satisfy them. But if they are set this coarse, then they are also satised by
human–ngers systems.
e argument can be made in a stronger way. It is not hard to imagine intelligent Martians
whose memory ismore dierent from our own than Otto’s notebook. A Martian might
have a very bizarre way of storing and recalling memories: using ectoplasm or encoding
memories using sub-atomic particles. Yet it seems possible that such creatures could
nevertheless have beliefs.erefore, a functionalist theory should set its grain parameter
coarse enough not to rule out such creatures from having beliefs. But if it sets the grain
parameter this coarse, then it will almost certainly be satised by the relatively modest
departures from internal human cognition involved in the Otto–notebook system.
In short, if a functionalist theory sets the parameter that controls the level of grain at which
two processes are functionally identical too ne, then intelligent Martians are not allowed,
and HEC is false for the reasons that RAA suggest. If it sets this parameter too coarse,
then intelligent Martians are allowed, but HEC comes out true.e problem that RAA
face is that there is no intermediate setting of the parameter that: (i) allows preservation
of the Martian intuition and (ii) makes HEC come out false. From a functionalist point of
view, the mereological sum of us and our artefacts are actual Martians.
ere are a few points to note.
First, I do not claim that there is a unique, or indeed any, correct setting of the grain
parameter for functionalism. Dierent settings are appropriate for dierent kinds of func-
tionalism, and someone hostile to functionalism might question if there is any reasonable
setting at all. My claim is that no matter what setting is chosen, if it is sucient to save
the Martian intuition, then HEC comes out true.
Second, it is worth emphasising that the argument concerns the actual existence of
extended cognitive processes, not their mere possibility. If functionalism admits possible
intelligent Martians, then extended systems in the actual world also qualify as mental.
One’s attitude to non-actual Martians commits one to the truth of HEC in the actual
world. A functionalist would be behaving like a NIMBY (not in my back yard) if she were
to allow possible intelligent Martians, but not actual HEC.
ird, the argument is not specic to any particular brand of functionalism. It applies
to any version of functionalism that saves the Martian intuition. If functionalism is
12. Clark and Chalmers (1998), p. 17.
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understood, not in terms of typical causes and eects, but in terms of a rough-and-
ready notion of functional organisation, a question of grain still arises: at what level of
abstraction should one specify the functional organisation necessary for mentality? At
too ne-grained a level, intelligent Martians are excluded. At too coarse-grained a level,
intelligent Martians are allowed but so too is extended cognition. e same applies to
Turing-machine functionalism, and functionalism based on explanatory, rather than
causal, roles.
Fourth, the ne/coarse-grained distinction cross-cuts the scientic/folk-psychological
distinction between functionalisms. Scientic functionalism (psychofunctionalism) looks
to empirical science to specify the causal roles; folk-psychological functionalism looks
to folk psychology. In both cases, a question of grain arises: how ne-grained should
one specify the functional roles? Which (scientic/folk-psychological) causes and eects
should one abstract or ignore? Both scientic functionalism and folk-psychological
functionalism can save, or fail to save, the Martian intuition by specifying the causal roles
in coarse or ne enough detail. If the causal roles are specied coarsely enough to allow
intelligent Martians, then HEC comes out true.
Fih, the argument is not specic to functional state identity theories or functional
specication theories. David Lewis and David Armstrong’s versions of functionalism
allow mind–brain identity claims to be asserted.13 On their view, the concept of pain is a
functional concept: anything that satises a certain functional role qualies, by denition,
as a pain state. Two physically type-distinct states ‘pain’-in-Martians and pain-in-humans
can qualify as genuine mental states, and as pain states, because both fall under the same
mental concept, pain. It does not matter here whether Lewis and Armstrong are correct in
this, note: (i) they too face a question about grain (which causes and eects are essential
in the specication associated with mental state concepts?); and (ii) they aim to save the
Martian intuition. Given (i) and (ii), once our mental concepts are specied coarsely
enough to preserve the Martian intuition, they also admit HEC.
Sixth, not all versions of functionalism aim to save the Martian intuition. A psycho-
functionalist might argue that the job of functionalism is only to capture generalisations
concerning actual organisms, and functional roles need only be broadened enough to
admit those creatures.is kind of functionalism eschews theMartian intuition, and so es-
capes the argument above. However, note: (I) Such a version of functionalism appeals only
if one restricts attention capturing generalisations relevant to actual-world psychology.
is is one job that a functionalist theory can perform, but it is also employed for a more
metaphysical task: to give a solution to themind–body problem. If one accepts this second
application of functionalism then it is hard see why attention should be restricted only to
actual organisms. (II)ere may be enough variation between actual organisms that have
mental states to broaden the functional roles suciently to make HEC true, at least for
some claimed instances of extended cognition. Humans, chimpanzees, whales, dolphins,
and octopuses have memory with dierent kinds of ne-grained characteristics. e
dierences in their functional architecture may push the grain parameter coarse enough
to admit at least some cases of HEC. (III)ere seems nothing to stop Martians from
coming into existence, either naturally, or by deliberate construction on our part. What
should we say on encountering such a creature? Would we say that it did not have mental
13. Armstrong (1968); Lewis (1983).
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states? Or would we broaden our characterisation of the functional roles to include it, and
at the same time, allow HEC? If the latter, then why not admit now that such organisms,
and hence actual extended systems, have mental states?
5 Radical HEC
Functionalism, if it saves theMartian intuition, entailsHEC.However, it is unclear whether
functionalism entails the version of HEC that Clark and Chalmers put forward. Clark
and Chalmers add extra conditions to the functionalist credo:
h1 e [external] resource be reliably available and typically invoked.
h2 Any information thus retrieved be more-or-less automatically endorsed. It should
not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the opinions of other people, for
example). It should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly
from biological memory.
h3 Information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when
required. (Clark 2010, pp. 6–7)14
What justies these extra conditions? Clark and Chalmers say nothing except that H1–H3
make HEC more modest and more plausible. e problem is that this modest form of
HEC is incompatible with a functionalist defence of HEC. Consider the conditions one at
a time.
H1: For a resource to be cognitive, it does not seem necessary that it be reliably available
or typically invoked. One could imagine a Martian with internal cognitive resources that
are neither reliably available nor typically invoked. e Martian might have cognitive
resources that are only available aer it gets a good night’s sleep, and it does not reliably
or oen get a good night’s sleep. However, that does not stop, on those occasions when
the Martian does get a good night’s sleep, from those resources counting as genuinely
cognitive. Another example is that the cognitive resources involved in acts of outstanding
human creativity are not reliably available or typically invoked, but if someone does
employ them, then that activity counts as part of their cognitive process. Just because
a cognitive process is not reliably available or typically invoked, that does not make it
non-cognitive or non-mental.
e same argument as Section 4 can be run. If the functional roles of cognitive states and
processes are specied broadly enough to allow for internal resources not to be reliably
available or typically invoked, then they should allow external resources not to be reliably
available or typically invoked either. Special pleading for constraints on the external but
not the internal conicts with the assumption—that conditions that favour the internal
14. Clark and Chalmers (1998), p. 17.
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over the external should be argued for, not stipulated ad hoc—on which the argument for
HEC was based.15
H2 requires that information retrieved from an external cognitive resource be: (i) more-or-
less automatically endorsed; (ii) not subject to critical scrutiny; (iii) deemed as trustworthy
as that from biological memory. All conditions are violated by actual and possible cases
of internal cognition.
One could imagine a creature whose internal resources violate H2/i. A Martian might
(redundantly) run several cognitive processes on a problem, compare the results, and only
endorse a result if all (or most) agree. Just because the Martian adopts a cautious attitude
towards its cognitive processes, that does not make those processes non-cognitive or non-
mental. Some human internal cognitive processes do not have their output automatically
endorsed either, e.g. imagining, supposing, desiring. If internal cognitive process do not
satisfy H2/i, then why should extended processes? Condition H2/ii fails for a similar
reason: a cautious Martian does routinely subject the output of its cognitive resources to
critical scrutiny, but its cognitive resources are not made non-cognitive or non-mental as
a result. Condition H2/iii also fails. One could imagine a Martian with internal memory
less trustworthy than human internal memory, but still trustworthy enough to count
as memory. One could imagine a series of creatures whose internal storage and recall
mechanisms are, in dierent ways, less trustworthy than internal human memory but still
trustworthy enough to count as memory. If internal resources can be less trustworthy
than biological memory, then why not external resources? Moreover, as was indicated for
H2/i, there are actual human internal cognitive resources that contain information that is
not deemed trustworthy at all.
H3 requires that information present in the external resource be easily accessible as and
when required.is condition is also violated. A Martian might have information in its
internal resources that it nds dicult to access, e.g. it might have beliefs that it nds
dicult to access.e Martian might need help, such as talking to a psychotherapist, to
access some of its buried beliefs. But just because some of its beliefs are dicult to access,
that does not make them less mental or cognitive. Humans also have mental information
stored in internal cognitive resources that cannot be easily accessed.e visual system
contains information about current eye position that cannot be easily accessed. Conscious
beliefs can also be dicult to access. A nervous student might cram information into her
cognitive resources before an exam that she is too nervous to recall during the exam, and
subsequently forgets, but although the information was never easily accessible, that did
not stop it from counting as genuinely cognitive while she had it.16,17
15. If H1 is modied to the condition that under ideal circumstances the resource should be reliably
available and typically invoked, then a related problem arises: justify why ideal circumstances should not
include the presence of those external objects that are rarely or unreliably available, and do so in a way that
does not beg the question against HEC, i.e. that does not exclude appeal to them simply because they are
external.
16. Again, appeal to normal or ideal conditions does not help. It raises the problem of justifying why
normal or ideal conditions should not include the easy accessibility of information in external artefacts
that are typically inaccessible.
17. Clark and Chalmers (1998) propose a fourth condition:
h4 e [external] resource be reliably available and typically invoked.
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Let us rehearse why H1–H3 should be rejected. H1–H3 are violated by actual and possible
cases of internal cognitive resources. is creates a problem for HEC: why, if internal
resources are allowed to violate H1–H3, should external resources not be? What justies
the dierential treatment? Why require that extended processes meet a higher bar? If
dierential treatment is acceptable here, then why not at the beginning of the argument for
HEC when it was claimed to be unacceptable to treat a resource dierently simply because
it was external?e problem with H1–H3 is that they violate the fair-treatment principle.
e fair-treatment principle requires that if an external case is judged non-cognitive, then
it should not be simply because it is external (equivalently, dierent standards should
not apply simply because it is external). External and internal cases should be treated
in an even-handed manner: if an extended process is relevantly similar to an internal
process, save for having external parts, then it has an equal claim to be cognitive. e
fair-treatment principle is required in order to make the functionalist argument for HEC
work. If an advocate of HEC violates this principle, then she blocks her own argument for
HEC.
Consequently, functionalism entails HEC, but not the modest version of HEC that Clark
and Chalmers put forward. However, the functionalist argument for HEC does entail
a radical form of HEC: HEC unqualied by extra conditions. e problem is that this
radical form of HEC is almost certainly false. It is wildly over-permissive in attributing
mental states. Here are some examples.
According to radical HEC, simply by picking up a book, I come to believe everything
contained in that book. e justication is as follows. Consider a Martian like the one
discussed in Section 4 who encodes memories using ink-marks. As well as acquiring
beliefs via its senses, it seems possible for such a Martian to be born with innate beliefs.
Furthermore, it seems possible for an organism to have innate beliefs that it has not
examined yet—a library of data that is hard-wired into the organism by developmental
processes, which the organism has not yet had cause to employ. Imagine that an ink-mark-
based Martian is born with a stock of innate beliefs, most of which it has not chosen, or
had cause, to examine yet, but it could if it wanted to. It seems conceivable that such
Martian could exist.e Martian has ink-marks inside its head that, if it were suciently
diligent, would guide its action in appropriate ways; I have ink-marks just outside my
head that, if I am suciently diligent, would guide my actions in appropriate ways.e
dierence between the Martian and me is that it has the ink-marks inside its head, while I
have the ink-marks outside. By the fair-treatment principle, if the Martian has the beliefs,
then so do I.
e same argument applies to cognitive processes. Imagine that my desktop computer
contains a program that calculates the dates of the Mayan calendar 5,000 years into the
future. As a matter of fact, I never run this program, entertain the question of what the
Mayan calendar is for any year, or even know that my computer contains such a program.
However, if I wanted to know the Mayan calendar and explored the resources of my
computer, the program would allow me to nd the answer quickly. According to the
As Clark and Chalmers admit, H4 is false of internal human cognition: one can acquire beliefs through
subliminal perception or memory tampering. It is also possible that a Martian could have innate beliefs
that it did not previously consciously endorse. Another problem is that H4 only applies to memory and
not to other cognitive processes.
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functionalist argument above, I possess a mental process that calculates the dates of the
Mayan calendar.e justication: one could imagine a Martian with an internal cognitive
process that calculates the dates of the Mayan calendar using the same algorithm. e
Martian’s ability could be innately present as an unintended by-product of the unfolding
of its genetic program. e Martian may never happen to use this cognitive process; it
may even be unaware that it has this cognitive process. However, like the card-counting of
Raymond Babbitt in Rain Man, the Martian may nd such a cognitive capacity awakened
under the right circumstances, and that it can easily answer relevant questions. e
Martian would be deploying an underused and hitherto dormant cognitive process. By
the fair-treatment principle, I also have that cognitive process (and similarly for other
programs of which I am unaware on my computer).18
Another example: Abel is a calculating prodigy who can perform feats of mental arith-
metic. Baker is a normal human subject equipped with a supercomputer.e functionalist
argument wrongly entails that Baker’s mental arithmetic powers outstrip Abel’s. e
justication: it is possible for a Martian to exist with the same internal functional organisa-
tion as the joint Baker–supercomputer system.erefore, by the fair-treatment principle,
Baker’s interactions with the supercomputer count as part of his cognitive process. Fur-
thermore, one cannot say that what Abel does is ‘more mental’ than Baker. Both have an
equal claim to mentality.e only dierence is that their mental processes have a dierent
ne-grained structure. However, it seems plain wrong to say what Baker does is just as
mental as Abel.
In order to rule out these cases it does no good to say that the relevant extended systems
only exist intermittently or for short periods of time. It is possible to imagine the relevant
populations of Martians popping in and out of existence intermittently and for short
periods of time without their internal processes being made non-mental as a result.
Similarly, as Clark and Chalmers argue, even if a neural implant is only plugged in
occasionally that need not stop it from counting as part of one’s mental activity when
present.19
e examples can be elaborated. By considering appropriate Martian scenarios, one can
argue that if I step into a library, I instantaneously acquire millions of beliefs. By browsing
the internet, I instantaneously acquire billions of beliefs. If we swap our address book,
we instantaneously swap our beliefs. Although human memory is not like a library, the
internet, or an address book—these have been abandoned as psychological models—it is
conceivable for an intelligent being to have a memory resource that does operate in that
way.ose psychological theories may be false of humans, but they are not (or at least,
not obviously) incoherent.is mere possibility is enough for the argument in Section 4
to work.
18. It is no objection that my activation of the computer program may require intentional action on my
part. One could imagine that the Martian requires similar intentional action, e.g. conscious searching
through its internal cognitive resources, in order to waken its dormant cognitive process. Moreover, it
is not clear that intentional action on my part is even necessary to parallel the Martian case—one could
imagine that the Mayan-calendar computer program just happens to be launched in a fortuitous set of
circumstances; once it is active I can easily answer questions about the Mayan calendar.
19. Clark and Chalmers (1998), p. 11.
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ese consequences of radical HEC seem false. Radical HEC should therefore be rejected.
Is there a more modest form of HEC that is acceptable? We saw that adding H1–H3 to
tame HEC did not work. Are there other conditions that can be added without disrupting
the functionalist argument?
ere are two reasons why such conditions are unlikely to be found.
First, any such conditions would have to satisfy the fair-treatment principle: they should
be satised not just by actual extended cognitive systems, but also by all actual and pos-
sible internal cognitive processes. But given the vast variety of possible internal cognitive
processes, such a condition would hardly be any constraint at all. e argument can
be phrased as follows. For any instance of actual human tool-use p for manipulating
representations, one can imagine a Martian who is otherwise like us, but with p as one of
its internal processes. It seems perfectly coherent for p to count as one of the Martian’s
cognitive processes—just imagine an organism identical to us, but with some extra cognit-
ive abilities or quirks involved in having internalised p. If p qualies as a possible internal
cognitive process, then it cannot be ruled as non-cognitive by any extra conditions: that
would violate the fair-treatment principle. It would be to say that if p were to occur
internally it would be cognitive, but when p occurs externally in an otherwise functionally
identical system it is non-cognitive. If p cannot be excluded by the extra conditions, then
it can only be excluded on functionalist grounds, and we have already shown that those
are too weak.erefore, if an extra constraint has to satisfy the fair-treatment principle, it
is hard to see how it can be any substantial constraint at all.
Second, it is not clear how adding an extra constraint would help to avoid radical HEC
anyway. Adding an extra constraint does not, by itself, disrupt the plausibility of the
Martian scenarios that generated radical HEC. If one admits that the Martians described
above have beliefs and cognitive processes, then by the functionalist argument and fair-
treatment principle, so do the corresponding extended systems. Adding an extra condition
does not block this inference. At most, it excludes further internal–external functionally
equivalent pairs from counting as cognitive.e only way to avoid radical HEC is either:
(i) drop the fair-treatment principle, or (ii) drop the claim that the Martians in those cases
have mental states.e rst option is unacceptable as a way to defend modest HEC.e
second option is unpromising too. If one were to give up the Martian intuition entirely,
then RAA’s criticism returns. If one wishes to save just those Martians that yield a modest
form of HEC, then the question arises of what makes this more than an ad hocmanoeuvre
to make modest HEC true. Why should mentality be granted to exactly those Martians
but not others? Why save an ink-mark-using Martian without innate beliefs, but not an
ink-mark-using Martian with innate beliefs? What justication, other than the truth of
modest HEC, is there to restrict mentality to just those Martians?
Another option for defending modest HEC is to say that H1–H3 should be kept, not as
individually necessary conditions for cognition, but along with the familiar functionalist
condition, as jointly sucient. Call such a theory JS-HEC.e Otto–notebook system
satises JS-HEC and so counts as mental. Paradigm internal instances of cognition satisfy
JS-HEC and so count as mental. However, radical instances of extended cognition do not
satisfy JS-HEC. JS-HEC is silent about these cases: it is an incomplete theory of mentality,
but one that supports modest HEC.
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However, such amanoeuvre only postpones problems.e fair-treatment principle pushes
JS-HEC beyond silence about functionally equivalent cases.e fair-treatment principle
requires that if the only signicant dierence between two processes is that one is extended
and the other internal, then both should have an equal claim to mentality. If two processes
have an equal claim to mentality then it would be disingenuous, and at worst misleading,
to claim that one is mental while remaining silent about the other.e examples of radical
extended cognition described above do not satisfy JS-HEC, and hence JS-HEC does not
judge them to be mental. However, they are functionally similar to internal cases that do
satisfy JS-HEC.erefore, by fair-treatment the external cases should count as mental too:
if those processes were to take place inside the head, then we would call them cognitive.
erefore, JS-HEC plus fair-treatment inates to radical HEC.
A variant of JS-HEC is to restrict functionalism’s application to only those internal
processes that do not have external counterparts that generate radical HEC. A non-
functionalist theory would be given for other internal processes, or we could remain silent
about them. Here, the fair-treatment principle would not get a grip, because the internal
cases corresponding to radical HEC are not even considered. e problem is that this
response, like that of selectively saving only those Martians that yield a modest form of
HEC, appears to be an unacceptably ad hocway to defendmodest HEC.What justication
is there for this particular division in the treatment of internal processes? What reason is
there to restrict functionalism to only those internal processes that yield modest HEC and
no more?ere seems no reason other than a question-begging fondness to save modest
HEC.
We have seen that the relationship between functionalism and HEC is an intimate one:
functionalism that saves the Martian intuition entails HEC.is appeared to give us good
reasons to think that HEC is true. However, functionalism only entails a radical form
of HEC.is form of HEC violates so many pre-theoretical intuitions about mentality,
that it is evidently false. e connection between functionalism and HEC now works
the other way: if functionalism only entails radical HEC, and radical HEC is false, then
functionalism is also false. Rather than HEC being a surprising true consequence of
functionalism, it is a counterexample to that theory.
6 e problem with functionalism
Which aspects of functionalism generate this problem?e fault appears to lie in the joint
acceptance of the following two intuitively plausible principles:
f1 If an organism counts as suciently like us on a coarse-grained global functional
comparison, then it is a cognitive agent.
f2 If a cognitive agent contains a representation-manipulating process that is signicant
for guiding its action (in appropriate ways) when employed, then that process is
one of its cognitive processes.20
20. e ‘appropriate way’ clause is to handle Block (1978)’s elementary particle people, who have repres-
entations inside their heads but those representations do not appear to guide the overall agent’s action in a
way that qualies as one of the agent’s cognitive processes.is clause does not eect the argument below.
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F1 is plausible on straightforward functionalist grounds. F2 is plausible on the grounds
that there could be alien cognitive processes: cognitive processes that are not similar, on
any piece-wise comparison, to any actual internal human cognitive process. Martians
might have dierent sensory modalities, and dierent ways of processing them. It would
be chauvinist to exclude such processes from mentality because they do not have human
equivalents. To a rst approximation, it appears that our intuitions about alien cognitive
processes are guided by something like F2: if a system already qualies as a cognitive agent,
then we are relatively generous in allowing its representation-manipulating processes to
count as cognitive processes. e key judgement is the global judgement: decide if an
organism is suciently like us to qualify as a cognitive agent. Once this judgement has
been made, all kinds of internal processes can count as cognitive.
F1 and F2 generate a wide range of Martian scenarios. Once the fair-treatment principle is
added, everything is in place for the inference from the possibility of intelligent Martians
to radical HEC.e fault with this inference seems to lie in either F1, F2, or fair-treatment.
e diculty is that it is not clear how any of these principles can be rejected.
An initially plausible target is F2. But an attack on F2 raises the question of how to
distinguish alien processes that do deserve mentality from those that do not. F2 may
get the details wrong, but something with a similarly liberal nature seems to be correct.
Once we have judged that an agent is cognitive, we appear to be extremely permissive
in allowing representational processes inside that agent to count as cognitive. So if F2 is
rejected, something still liberal enough to support radical HEC is likely to take its place. If
one rejects not just F2, but also those more general liberal intuitions, then a worry about
chauvinism arises: Why cannot Martians have extra sensory modalities? Why cannot
Martians have unique cognitive processes? Cannot one make sense of humans having
extra, or dierent, cognitive processes?
F1 has already received a great deal of attention. It does not seem open to anything
other than a wholehearted rejection of functionalism. As we saw in Section 4, F1 cannot
be qualied by adjusting the grain parameter to allow for intelligent Martians but not
extended cognition. While the agent has a tool to hand, the joint agent–tool system
qualies, in terms of a coarse-grained functional comparison, as a cognitive agent.
e fair-treatment principle is also hard to reject. One might try to weaken the principle
to allow for the possibility of extended cognition, but not require that internal and external
cases be treated equally. It is conceivable that internal processes could carry more weight
in judgements of mentality than extended processes.is raises the question of howmuch
extra weight internal cases should carry. If internal cases carry too much weight, then
any argument for HEC disappears. If internal and external cases carry equal weight, then
radical HEC results. What intermediate setting should be used? Again, we appear to have
nothing to guide us in our decision other than brute, contested, intuitions about the truth
and falsity of modest HEC. But it would be question begging to modify fair-treatment just
enough to yield modest HEC, justied by the intuition that modest HEC is true, while
going on to employ that principle as an argument for modest HEC. In any case, it is worth
noting that the fair-treatment principle seems plausible as it stands.
Neither F1, F2, nor fair-treatment are obvious candidates for rejection. A more radical
approach may be in order. e correct lesson may be that our intuitions about mental
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systems cannot be systematised without doing serious damage to our concept of mentality.
Functionalism aims to provide an answer to what makes certain systems mental. Perhaps
such an answer cannot be given. ere may be no single specication, either physical
or functional, that all and only mental states and processes of a given kind satisfy. e
most we can say is that competent observers agree that some systems and processes are
mental and others are not, and in some cases no agreement can be reached.ere is no
underlying theory to be given of the mental/non-mental contrast. Mental systems do not
form a natural kind.
is kind of quietism about mentality is no easy resting place for two reasons. First, the
mental/non-mental contrast seems like a genuine joint, and the thought that some unied
account of it can be given is still compelling. Second, on the quietist view we not only lose
any argument for HEC, but also any argument against HEC.e hope was that one could
appeal to general theories of mentality to decide whether extended cases were mental or
not. If quietism is correct, then there is no way of resolving these cases: they are simply
cases where competent observers dier.
7 Metaphysical vs. explanatory arguments for HEC
Clark and Chalmers have a second argument for HEC that they do not clearly distinguish
from the metaphysical argument above.is argument is in terms of HEC’s explanatory
value.eir claim is that, not only are extended processes metaphysically like cognitive
processes, but also that it suits the explanatory aims of cognitive science to treat extended
processes as cognitive processes. e explanatory value of HEC to cognitive science is
an argument for HEC’s truth. In contrast, RAA argue that it suits the explanatory aims
of cognitive science not to treat extended processes as cognitive processes, and therefore
we have good reasons to reject HEC. Hence, there are good reasons to think that HEC is
false.21
Both Clark and Chalmers and RAA think that the explanatory value of HEC to cognitive
science is a guide toHEC’s truth.eir disagreement concerns whether HEC’s explanatory
contribution is positive or negative. I wish to argue that both Clark andChalmers and RAA
aremistaken on this point. Any attempt to settle the status ofHEC by appeal to explanatory
value to cognitive science is misguided.ere is no inference from the explanatory value
of HEC to its truth/falsity, because a competing hypothesis exists with (almost) the same
explanatory value but a divergent truth value from HEC.e failure is typical in inference
to the best explanation: the existence of a serious competing alternative.
21. Rupert: ‘HEC’s plausibility depends on . . . [it providing] a coherent and fruitful framework within
which to place all, or at least a healthy majority of, signicant results in cognitive science . . . If the cases
canvassed here are any indication, adopting HEC results in a signicant loss of explanatory power or, at
the very best, yields only an unmotivated reinterpretation of results that can, at little cost, be systematically
accounted for within a more conservative framework’ (Rupert 2004, pp. 407, 390). Adams and Aizawa: ‘In
contrast to intracranial processes, transcranial processes are not likely to give rise to interesting scientic
regularities . . .ere just isn’t going to be a science covering the motley collection of “memory” processes
found in human tool use . . .Our view is that cognitioncs [without HEC] will produce a natural science,
where cognitionc [with HEC] will not’ (Adams and Aizawa 2001, pp. 61–62).
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e alternative hypothesis, the hypothesis of embedded cognition (HEMC), was intro-
duced by Rupert, but he does not seem to acknowledge that it undermines his argument
for the falsity of HEC as well as Clark and Chalmers’ argument for its truth. HEMC, like
HEC, claims that the study of cognition should involve an understanding of how an agent
exploits its environment. HEMC acknowledges that cognitive processes depend in just the
way that HEC suggests—intimately, and in hitherto unexpected ways—on the presence
of external props and the structure of the environment. However, HEMC stops short of
claiming that those external props are mental. According to HEMC, extra-cranial features
play an essential role in cognition; according to HEC, those features play the same role
and they are mental. In short, HEMC is HEC shorn of the claim that the extra-cranial
features are mental.
e dierence in explanatory value to cognitive science between HEMC and HEC is
small. Both advocate the same kind of reform of cognitive science to include the study
of mind–world relationships. Similar explanations are available in each case. It is hard
to imagine any cognitive phenomenon that HEC, but not HEMC, can explain or vice
versa.22 A working cognitive scientist could switch between the two frameworks with
little or no modication of her empirical work.e turn from individualism to embedded
cognition is radical, but once that turn has been made, there is little to choose, in terms of
explanatory value to cognitive science, between the two frameworks.
ere is little to choose, but Rupert claims that HEMC is ‘more conservative’ and hence
should be preferred.23 However, this is unclear. HEMC does not claim that as much of the
world is mental, but HEC is more conservative along a dierent dimension: it requires
fewer steps in the explanation of action. On HEC, one can explain why Otto walked to
53rd Street simply by saying that Otto wanted to go to MoMA and believed that it was on
53rd Street:
e alternative is to explain Otto’s action in terms of his occurrent desire to go
to the museum, his standing belief that theMuseum is on the location written
in the notebook, and the accessible fact that the notebook says the Museum
is on 53rd Street; but this complicates the explanation unnecessarily . . . to
explain things this way is to take one step too many. It is pointlessly complex,
in the same way that it would be pointlessly complex to explain Inga’s actions
in terms of beliefs about her memory.e notebook is a constant for Otto,
in the same way that memory is a constant for Inga; to point to it in every
belief/desire explanation would be redundant. In an explanation, simplicity
is power. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 13)
erefore, HEC is not straightforwardly explanatorily poorer than HEMC. It posits more
mental activity, but it has the virtue of allowing cognitive science to give shorter explana-
tions.
22. Rupert provides a detailed description of how HEMC can replace HEC in cognitive science with
little or no explanatory loss illustrated with a number of examples. I will not repeat these here. Rupert
develops HEMC fromMcClamrock (1995).
23. Rupert (2004), pp. 395, 405, 421, 424.
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HEC and HEMC have slightly dierent explanatory shapes. e question is whether
their dierent explanatory shapes yield a net explanatory value suciently, and knowably,
dierent to warrant an inference to the best explanation. Are they dierent enough that
we can say that one is clearly better than the other? Contra Clark, Chalmers, and RAA, the
dierences provide no argument for the truth or falsity of HEC.is is for two reasons.
First, although their explanatory properties are dierent, the net gains and losses in
moving from one hypothesis to the other appear to be relatively minor and arguably
negligible considering the wider explanatory aims of cognitive science.e explanatory
gains and losses described above do not dramatically further the aims of cognitive science;
at best, they amount to small tweaks around the edges. A cognitive scientist could,
perfectly rationally, prefer one framework over the other. A persistent commitment to
one framework could be chalked up to individual prejudice, entrenchment of existing
viewpoint, desire for dierent kinds of neatness, or an iconoclastic desire for revolutionary
talk. None of these seem sucient to warrant an inference to the truth or falsity of HEC.
Second, even if one does think that the gains and losses are explanatorily signicant, it is
far from obvious which hypothesis would win in a trade-o, or whether there would be a
uniform winner in all cases of psychological explanation. We are not in a position to know
how the explanatory costs of the respective positions should be balanced (positing more
mental stu vs. longer explanations). For an inference to the best explanation to fail, it is
not necessary that there be zero dierence in explanatory value between the competing
alternatives. All that is required is that there be no clear winner. is seems to be the
case, as the possibility of rationally preferring one explanation to the other appears to
suggest. Notably, this is not a matter of lack of empirical knowledge. No matter howmuch
empirical knowledge we acquire, the explanatory winner would still not be clear.24,25
erefore, although HEC and HEMC have dierent explanatory characters, to the best of
our knowledge, their net explanatory worth is not signicantly dierent.is invalidates
both inferences to the best explanation.ere is no inference from the explanatory value
of HEC to its truth, because HEMC, to the best of our knowledge, has no less explanatory
value than HEC and holds HEC is false.ere is no inference from the lack of explanatory
value of HEC to HEMC’s truth and HEC’s falsity, since HEC, to the best of our knowledge,
24. Clark (2007) claims that empirical evidence favours HEC over HEMC. In reply to Rupert, Clark
cites processes for which empirical psychologists nd it fruitful to consider recruitment of extra-cranial
resources (see Goldin-Meadow (2003); Gray et al. (2006); Paul (2006)). However, Clark does nothing to
establish the crucial point that any clear explanatory benet accrues to the claim that these extra-cranial
resources are mental, as opposed to essential non-mental props in intimate law-like relations with the
agent (pp. 171–174, 183–189).
25. Aizawa (2007) claims that scientic evidence favours HEMC over HEC in at least one case.e case
is Noë (2004)’s claim that perceptual experience is constituted by sensorimotor skills (COH) as opposed to
merely being causally related to sensorimotor skills (CAH). Aizawa claims that CAH should be preferred
to COH because it better accounts for the fact that neuromuscular blockades paralyse sensorimotor skills
but leave perceptual experience intact. Suppose that Aizawa is right—perception should be regarded as an
essentially dierent department of the mind from sensorimotor skills.is settles an aspect of cognitive
architecture, but does not settle the HEC/HEMC question. Are extra-cranial sensorimotor skills mental or
are they merely non-mental adjuncts intimately related to the central cognitive resources of the agent?
Both hypotheses are compatible with Aizawa’s data about paralysis. e problem is that COH makes a
claim about both cognitive architecture and HEC. Aizawa’s evidence only tells against the former. Similarly,
Noë’s empirical evidence supposedly in favour of COH is compatible with HEC and HEMC (Aizawa 2007,
pp. 11–20).
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is not signicantly explanatorily worse o than HEMC. It is of course open to attack both
HEC and HEMC, but this is not an option that Rupert or Adams and Aizawa wish to
pursue. Neither wish to deny the externalism common to both hypotheses. ey deny
only the extra metaphysical claim made by HEC.
One might compare the failure of the explanatory argument for HEC with similar failures
in other problematic cases for functionalism. Although it is controversial whether Ned
Block’s China-headed robot would or would not have mentality, the question cannot
be settled by explanatory value to cognitive science. It would make little explanatory
dierence to cognitive science either way, even if such a robot were actual. Similarly,
whether a tool is literally part of our mind or merely an essential non-mental prop makes
little dierence to cognitive science.emetaphysical dierence betweenHEC andHEMC
has vanishingly little traction on the day-to-day work of cognitive science. Awarding the
encomium ‘mental’ may have rhetorical value in focusing attention on previously ignored
environmental features. But appeal to rhetorical value is no argument for the truth of
HEC.
8 Conclusion
e most plausible justication of HEC is the functionalist argument given in Section 4.
eMartian intuition is central to this argument. It is perhaps surprising that the existence
of actual extended minds turns out to depend on our attitude towards possible Martians.
e Martian intuition is two-edged however: it provides a defence against RAA and an
argument for HEC but it commits one to a radical form of HEC. It is imaginable that
someone might stubbornly assert the truth of radical HEC in the face of this argument.
However, she would win few friends by doing so. Although not overtly contradictory,
radical HEC violates so many pre-theoretical intuitions that it simply appears to get the
facts aboutmentality wrong. If one is insensitive to this, then it is unclear how any evidence,
short discovery of outright contradiction, could bear against radical HEC. Unless one
wishes to dogmaticallymaintainHEC comewhatmay, radical HEC, and the functionalism
that supports it, seem false.
HEC is still compelling as a metaphor. It eectively spurs one’s attention to mind–world
relationships.is is perhaps where the real value of HEC lies: not as a claim that we have
reason to believe is true, but as a claim that serves a rhetorical and heuristic purpose for
cognitive science. It draws out attention to mind–world relationships, and it dramatises
their importance. A second purpose for HEC is that it can serve as a constraint on theories
of mentality. Abstracting away from the details of functionalism, it is hard to come up
with any theory of mentality that allows for possible intelligent Martians but avoids false
claims about radical extended cognition. Human–artefact interactions can be added to
the familiar array of test cases for a theory of mentality. HEC, indicative of problems with
functionalism, may be helpful in shaping a successor theory.
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